V-22 Osprey

General Sullivan writes: "Randy Black is greatly misinformed about the V-22 Osprey in stating that it is a "worthless weapons system". I flew the prototype XV-15 back in 1987. It was a smaller version of the V-22, but it operated and flew exactly the same as the controversial V-22 Osprey. It was very easy to fly, very responsive and so much more capable and versatile than a helicopter. I helped write the operational concepts for the Marines' V-22 when I was in charge of the Warfighting Center, Quantico, Va in 1988-1990.

We had it scheduled to perform at six different missions including the primary mission of ferrying troops. Most helos have only one mission. It could have been an airborne early warning aircaft, and ECM platform, a tanker for helos and tactical jets, an airborne Direct Air Support Center and a high speed, life saving MedEvac platform. When our UH-1Ns and Cobras wore out, we were going to procure the smaller version of the V-22 and use it as a Tactical Airborne Controller and as an airborne Forward Air Controller for close air support missions. Every tactical aircraft the Marines owned would then have either a short take-off capability or a vertical take-off capability plus all would land vertically (STOVL). We are still planning to replace our aging Harriers which are already STOVL and F/A-18s with the short take-off & vertical landing F-35, Joint Strike Fighter. This way all Marine tactical aircraft can fly from the small amphibious ships where the ground Marines are located at sea vice having to be based on an aircraft carrier away from our troops and where we can't guarantee we'll be there to support them.

We knew technology would be the difficult part trying to catch up with the concept for the V-22 but American aerospace industries said they could do it. We knew that tilt rotor technology was revolutionary but to have a more survivable assault troop carrier that could fly three times the speed and three times as far as a conventional helo was worth the effort. First of all, the CH-46 which it was to replace, had been flying since 1965 and today that same aircraft is our frontline helo troop carrier requiring maintenance inspections every three hours. The aircraft is older than the pilots flying it and the trooper riding in the back. Enduring Freedom demonstrated how badly we needed the V-22 when these old, tired, CH-46s had to fly from the ships in the Indian Ocean to Camp Rhino in Afghanistan approximately 450 NM north. It took five flights and two to three days to get them there. Refueling and maintenance requirement had to be establish along the way in Pakistan and Afghanistan. If we had the V-22 they could have made the flight in one sortie at speeds approaching 300 kts with no overflight support or basing requirements needed from foreign governments. It was fortunate that we had no loss of helos or troopers on that long trek into Afghanistan but we were all holding our breath. True, the aircraft has killed 30 or so souls in development. 15 of those were troopers and were a needless loss as they shouldn't of been riding tactically in the Osprey for a night training mission in the desert when it was still in a test phase. Test aircrews accept the risks envolved because they believe in the mission and aircraft while doing their best to fulfill the test requirements for service acceptance. The V-22 is going through the most thorough and critical testing ever established by DOD and, so far, there have no major setbacks since this new testing began.

Randy says that Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, tried to kill the program. That is true, as he was very pro Air Force, which had some big ticket items like the F-22 coming down the line. He knew that the dollars wouldn't be there for all these programs, and he figured the V-22 was a high risk program, so why take the risk. He left as Secretary of Defence, and the Clinton Administration saw the merit in the program as a vital requirement for the Marine Corps and Special Operations forces.

Congress has appropriated more $$$ for procurement of a few more operational Ospreys, not test aircraft. I'm the first to say cancel the program, even though we've spent billions on it, if it can't demonstrate it is a safe aircraft for our troops to fly and it won't be a maintenance nightmare for our mechanics to maintain. The Marine Corps needs this capability badly and so does the nation. The Army has lost nine helos in Iraq since May. Because of the V-22s speed and greater range allowing it to fly higher, it is much more survivable today than a conventional helo. This is ideal for civil aviation to go into high density areas where there is no more room for runways or to small towns that have no airport. There is a lot of interest by commuter airlines in seeing the Osprey successfully pass its rigid testing and become operational as they feel it has great potential. There are five of these aircraft at MCAS New River, near Camp Lejeune, going through testing by a Marine test squadron while others are at Patuxent River,Md going through testing by Navy and Marine test pilots".

Randy Black comments: "I agree with your comment that the generals and admirals tell Congress what they want, completely. But the other person's comment that the weapons are simply "proposed" by the Administration's budget, as if to say that they Administration dreams up what they think the military needs, flies in the face of common sense. Regarding the claim that this many or that many retired stars and stripes types signed some type of petition might be more effective if it revealed how many retired officers exist, how many were queried and how many said, "No way Jose'"

Cameron Sawyer enters the discussion about the V-22 Osprey: "One of the problems with military technology is that in combat, the best of some kind of equipment may be worth more than ten of the same thing but with 90% of the capability. Imagine two companies of tanks, one of which has guns which can penetrate 38cm of armor at typical range and angle, and the other which has guns which can penetrate 40cm of armor at typical range and angle. All tanks have 39cm armor. The fact that the former cost even 50% of the latter, does not justify the economy.

As a result of the sometimes overwhelming effect of technological breakthroughs, a nation which wants to be sure that its military can’t be defeated by lesser forces must make damned sure that its stays on the cutting edge of technology. Military force is proportionate to how much you spend on it, if technology is equal. A technological advantage, however, can offset everything else. That is why military planners are simply forced to risk money on R&D, and on experiments with a high rate of failure. If they don’t, they risk much more.

The V-22 is a truly revolutionary aircraft which can take off and land like a helicopter and fly like regular airplane. If it can be made to work, it will provide a tremendous tactical advantage, quite disproportionate to its cost, to our military. It will be able to transport some tons of equipment and soldiers with a range (more than 2,000 nautical miles) and speed (claimed 275 knots) in a different class from any helicopter (the CH-46 has about half the range, and a little over half the speed), and yet will be able to takeoff and land without the benefit of any airstrip.

Whether such a technological leap forward – not an incremental improvement of an existing technology, but a wholly new one – is worth experimenting with or not depends on evaluations of those risks which you and I cannot do sitting around the kitchen table. Since the V-22 is indeed flying, I don’t think we have the right to assume that the idea was a crackpot one. On the contrary, to this layman the V-22 seems like an excellent priority. Wars are won with logistics, as much as anything else – getting the people and weapons into place and supplied. An army with an aircraft like the V-22 fighting an army with only helicopters would be very much like an army with helicopters fighting an army with no air transport capability at all. That’s quite a huge advantage".

See: http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/v22/flash.html

Of the V-22 Osprey, Randy Black says: "With all due respect to General Sullivan:

Fact: At least thirty soldiers, pilots and others have died in it.

Fact: Internal program documents (from 2003) ...show that the groundbreaking tilt-rotor aircraft -- 20 years and $14.7 billion in the making -- is failing two critical tests it was supposed to have passed several years ago. The program is projected to cost about $50 billion when it's all said and done, but will not carry the load that the original specs promised.

Fact: The military falsified repair and maintenance records pertaining ot the aircraft. From 2001: The two-star general who leads Marine Corps aviation forces in the Atlantic faces discipline for dereliction of duty because officers under his authority allegedly altered maintenance records for the Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, the corps announced Friday.

Lt. Gen. Raymond Ayres, commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Va., said the officers have agreed to appear at hearings at which Ayres alone will weigh the evidence and impose penalties. Being summoned to such a hearing effectively ends an officer's career.

The highest-ranking officer implicated is Maj. Gen. Dennis T. Krupp, commander of the 2nd Marine Air Wing at Cherry Point, N.C., near Jacksonville. The dereliction charge against the 33-year veteran of the Marine Corps said Krupp either knew or should have known about the falsified maintenance records.

...(the) charges against the eight officers arose from a secretly recorded audio tape of a meeting Leberman convened with his squadron on Dec. 29. The Osprey had experienced two fatal crashes in 2000. Leberman told the squadron there was pressure from above his pay grade about the Osprey's overall performance, so, "We have to lie," on maintenance records.

http://www.newsobserver.com/osprey/story/1277745p-1311105c.html
and:
http://www.newsobserver.com/osprey/story/1277749p-1311170c.html

JACKSONVILLE (2003) -- The crash of a V-22 Osprey aircraft that killed four Marines in December was caused by a design flaw that had been known for months but went largely uncorrected, according to pilots who participated in an official investigation of the accident.

The pilots, all current or former officers in the Marines' first Osprey squadron, said the design flaw in the aircraft's hydraulic system was compounded by a software glitch that could have been detected by more rigorous testing.

http://www.newsobserver.com/osprey/story/1277758p-1311084c.html
Fact: An Air Force-commissioned study concluded last year that even if the V-22 Osprey's technical problems are solved, the tilt-rotor aircraft will be less effective than helicopters that cost far less. http://www.newsobserver.com/osprey/story/2492933p-2320669c.html

The person who wrote the study mentioned herein was fired for his conclusions. He is Everest Riccioni, 79, of Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif., ...a distinguished and iconoclastic figure in Air Force circles. He was a fighter pilot and a test pilot and taught advanced engineering at the Air Force Academy. He was instrumental in the design of the F-16 and F-18 fighters and worked with defense contractor Northrop after retiring.

As I said, the Air Force fired him after he submitted the report that he said "was kind to the Air Force" all things considered".

General Sullivan says: "I agree with Cameron Sawyer's posting, but our current CH-46 with 12 troops aboard has about a 150 NM range. Because it's so old and worn out the pax loading has been reduced from 24 to 12 combat loaded Marines. The V-22 was designed to replace the CH-46 and carry 24 pax. The V-22 had to be able to operate in a high threat area that has an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), and its vastly increased speed and range make it much more survivable for vertical assault. With its great range it can fly around the lethal range of the SAM rings where a conventional helo wouldn't have the range to do that.

There have been three V-22 fatal accidents in testing with a loss of 7, 19 (15 troopers shouldn't have been aboard), and 4 respectively. Every US military aircraft that I can remember had crashes during the development stage. From these crashes much is learned to install fixes so that these types of failure never happen again. The loss of the 19 Marines was due not to a mechanical failure but to the pilot's failure to react properly to a flight condition on approaching landing that had not been common in helos previously. Now this flight phenomenon is stressed heavily in the pilot's handbook. They have redesigned some of the flight characteristics of the aircraft up to make it easier to recognize and handle this flight condition".

David Westbrook comments: "This is a fascinating exchange. I have two questions. First, could someone be more specific about the technical difficulties? Second, has the political opposition (motivated for whatever reason) from Cheney and others died down in the light of the sorts of fighting being done in recent conflicts?

Tim Brown says: "I am very appreciative of General Sullivan's extensive explanation of the Osprey. I would only add that from the Marine grunt's (infantryman's) perspective, having tactical air support on station as much of the time as possible is an absolute godsend. When a fire-fight starts or an ambush is popped, being able to call in close air support within minutes or even seconds can make all the difference. As I understand it, the Osprey, besides being faster, more survivable and a superior weapons platform, can also stay on station much longer than any helicopter or jet aircraft. And even when it is not actually on station, as a STOVL, because it can be on-call closer to the front it can arrive faster than any other platform. In short, the Osprey can deliver superior force at the place of battle at the time of battle, and that is the difference between victory and defeat".

Randy Black says: "Tim Brown's comments about the Osprey confuse me. The V-22 is not a weapons platform. It is a troop carrier and is unarmed".

Randy Black says: "While I hesitate to disagree with my longtime Moscow friend, Cameron Sawyer, unfortunately, there is the other side of the story: http://www.NewsAndOpinion.com | The Marine Corps must decide soon whether to fish or cut bait on the V-22 Osprey. For the sake of our Marines, our national defense and our long-suffering taxpayers, I hope they cut bait. [The meaning is not clear to me. Presumably, scrap the program. RH].

The tilt-rotor Osprey can take off and land like a helicopter, but fly like an airplane, because the rotors at the end of each wing tilt forward to act as propellers. The Osprey promised to go farther and faster than any helicopter in military history. The Marine Corps should be commended for its boldness in taking risks on the new technology.
But technology does not always keep its promises. And boldness, which is good, can ossify into stubbornness, which is not. Real world experience indicates that the tilt-rotor is a technology whose time has not yet come. Thanks to the "vortex ring state," it may never come.

The vortex ring state was the culprit in a crash in Arizona in April 2000 that killed 19 Marines. An Osprey was at about 300 feet when it suddenly flipped over and plunged into the ground. When another Osprey crashed in December, flight testing was suspended until May 2002. The vortex ring state is a wing-induced rotor stall unique to tilt-rotors. Carlton Meyer, a former Marine who edits the Web site G2Mil.com, explains: "As a tilt-rotor descends vertically, each wing pushes the airflow away from half its rotor. The faster it descends, the greater the vacuum the wings create, resulting in less lift. As the pilots maneuver a V-22, they may shift the airflow causing one rotor to lose so much lift that it literally falls and flips the aircraft over."

A skilled pilot can avoid the vortex ring state by descending slowly; by not going straight down, and by not making sudden maneuvers during descent. This would be fine if the Osprey were to be used for commuter flights. But for a Marine assault force approaching a landing zone which has turned "hot," coming in slow and straight can be hazardous to health. The vortex ring state can be avoided if the Osprey descends no faster than 800 feet per minute. But most military helicopters can descend safely at 2,000 feet per minute. And because they don't have to worry about flipping over if they juke and weave, conventional helicopters can take evasive action to avoid enemy fire.

The Osprey has two other problems. There are no door gunners, because the tilt rotors on the end of the wings would block much of a gunner's view and his field of fire. And the V-22's small rotors kick up substantial "downwash," kicking up clouds of dust thick enough to impair a pilot's vision, and forcing dismounting Marines to lie flat on the deck until the Osprey has departed the landing zone.

The Osprey costs a great deal more than other helicopters that perform the same missions, so even if the safety problems are solved, the Osprey's performance must be a great deal better to justify buying it. It isn't. The Osprey can cruise at 240 knots, about 40 percent faster than the helicopters it is supposed to replace, the CH-46E Sea Knight and the CH-53E Super Stallion. Its range (515 nautical miles) is considerably greater than that of the Sea Knight (132 nautical miles), but less than that of Super Stallion (540 nautical miles), or the Navy's new MH-60S "Nighthawk" helicopter when it is equipped with external fuel tanks.

Boeing claims the Osprey can lift 15,000 pounds externally, but it has yet to lift more than 11,000 pounds in tests. The CH-46 could lift 10,000 pounds when it was new. The CH-53 can lift 28,000 pounds vertically. The Osprey can carry 24 combat-loaded Marines, same as the CH-46. The Osprey weighs as much as a Super Stallion, and is much more likely to tip over in a choppy sea. The Osprey burns fuel at twice the rate of the Sea Knight, and breaks down more often than does that 35-year-old-helicopter.

The defense budget for this fiscal year calls for purchase of 11 Ospreys at $120 million each. This compares with a cost of $25 million each for the Nighthawk, and an estimated cost of $21 million each to extend the life of the Super Stallion. You don't need to be an engineer or a tactician to realize the Marines would be better off with a mixture of MH-60s and CH-53s than with the Osprey. You only need to be able to do arithmetic".

General Sullivan says: "I will comment on thr three V-22 posting that I have just received. First, Randy Black is way over his head and out of his league in trying to debate the V-22 or the problem of falsifying records at MCAS New River, NC during 2001. I am very qualified to speak on both issues. The V-22 will meet its military specifications in range, speed and payload or it won't be procured, so any talk of obtaining an aircraft that's less capable than DOD's requirements and specifications is false. This is not just another fighter or helo, it's a major challenge for technology and it takes a long time to develop it. Most military aircraft take at least 10 year from concept to joining the operating aviation units of the service procuring it. The V-22s past problems were mainly hydraulic failures to the flight control systems which caused loss of control of the aircraft and therefore, it crashed. We have lost 30 souls, mostly Marines, in the three crashes, as I delineated in my previous email. The V-22 uses 5,000 psi hydraulic systems and most other aircraft use 3,000 psi systems. This presented major problems for the manufacturers of the V-22. There were a few minor computer problems for some of the automated systems. The problem that everyone was concerned about initially, was the decoupling of the shaft that runs both propellers if one engine fails. This would be catastrophic, but it has never occurred and the aircraft can fly safely on a single engine, with both propellers turning.

Now the part about the investigation of the V-22 that was caused by a trooper listening and recording a talk given by the CO of the helo training squadron (HMT) that was double hatted to test the V-22. The trooper sent the information to the DOD, where the CO told the squadron to falsify the figures and data if need be on the daily and monthly reports. This CO had been under tremendous pressure from HQMC Aviation in Washimgton DC to complete the tests so that the DOD would approve the program and we could get the V-22 into the Fleet asap as the CH-46 was on its last legs. This pressure from the Washington DC Aviation Marines bypassed the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW) at Cherry Point which had this HMT under its command. HQMC Aviation went directly to the helo training squadron on a daily basis. The CG, 2nd MAW was totally out of the loop, He was an F/A-18 pilot, and when he visited the New River V-22 operation on a regular basis, he asked the right questions on its progress, but he received watered down or erroneous answers as the squadron wanted this program to succeed. They were dealing with HQMC Aviation, and HQMC knew the true picture. All involved thought the problems could be fixed by working with the TechReps. The V-22 was an excellent aircraft. When the trooper's disclosure made the national news, DOD held an investigation and found only the CO of HMT culpable. However, HQMC in Washington DC wanted to be sure Marines up and down the chain of command were squeaky clean. That's the way Marines look at integrity and responsibility. My complaint was that they started at the CG, 2nd MAW level vice at the top at HQMC Aviation who really ran the V-22 program and worked daily with HMT. LtGen Ayres, Marine Forces Atlantic Commander, held the disciplinary hearing on the eight officers. All were acquitted except the HMT CO and a Warrant Officer. They received fines and letters in their official record, and it ended their careers. The sad thing is Major General Denny "Jersey" Krupp, who was CG, 2nd MAW, ended up retiring since he had been tainted. He is a close friend of mine, we both commanded the same fighter squadron, VMFA 323 at El Toro, and both commanded the 2nd MAW as General officers. In fact, he was in my squadron as a Captain when I was CO, so I've watched him for his entire career. He was destined to take over Marine Aviation at HQMC, Wash DC, as he was the most qualified and experienced, both in the air and previous HQMC staff tours, Marine aviator in the Corps and had considerable aircraft carrier experience, which is a must when dealing with the Navy in the Pentagon. The Marines are feeling his absence today.

A side note to this tragic story is that I was out in Los Angeles and had just boarded an airliner to return to North Carolina when I started reading the Los Angeles Times. I found to my surprise a four column picture and story of Major General Denny "Jersey" Krupp with a frowning, guilty look on his face. The media were implying that he was guilty. They had found a picture taken earlier at New River during the Memorial Service for the four Marines lost in the last crash that grounded the aircraft for over a year and generated all the media attention.. He looked so sad like anyone attending a Memorial Service in the Chapel with the families of the fallen Marines. If you've never attended one of these memorial services, I can tell you from experiencethat it's a gut wrenching experience that rips your heart out. Grown men, tough Marines break down and weep openly.

Today the V-22s are being tested by a separate Marine testing squadron not attached to the 2nd MAW and not under the command or influence of the HMT. This takes 2nd MAW out of the testing business which it should have never been in to start as it's mission is to prepare squadrons to be combat ready.

I'll answer David Westbrook's questions as best I can. First, I think I answered the main technical problems;the aircraft was mainly hydraulic. Another problem early on was it was a real "bear" to work on. It seemed the parts that failed were three deep. The maintenance guys had to pull off so many parts to get to the failed part that they ended up messing up the parts they were taking off and putting back on. There have been several engineering service changes to produce better maintainability and reduce part failures. Remember, a lot of the maintenance will be done on the flight deck at sea that could have 20-30 kts of wind over the deck.

David's asks if criticism of the V-22 has lessened. I think it's still there, but it comes the other services and lobby groups, not from the DOD or the White House. The reason they're still attacking the V-22 is that there are not going to befunds available to field all the new aircraft programs. Something must give. We have the Air Force's F-22 Raptor at $258 million per copy, far behind schedule. It is being closely looked at by the DOD and Congress. We have the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, with orders supposedly around 3000 from the USAF, Marines, Navy and several allied countries. It's starting to get behind schedule and must reduce its weight. The hardest problem to solve is getting the weight down on the STOVL model for the Marines, RAF and Royal Navy. Even the USAF has indicated it likes some STOVL F-35s but would cancel the order in a second if their F-22 was threatened.

The Navy has the F/A-18 Super Hornets now being produced and operational in several squadrons with more forming every month as it trades in the tired F-14 Tom Cats. This program has already been cut by nearly 200 aircraft. The Navy also wants a carrier version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter but would probably drop out of the program if the DOD said that to get the F-35 it would have to stop production on the Super Hornets.

The Marines' requirement for a tactical assault troop carrying aircraft that must make a vertical landing and take-off means an aircraft that must be able to operate as helicopter. Since this is how we get our Marines into battle at sea or ashore, it remains the most critical deficiency in the Marine Corps. We must have a replacement for the CH-46. The F-35B is the STOVL model of the Joint Strike Fighter and the Marine Corps will neck down to an all STOVL force by replacing the AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18 C/D Hornets with F-35Bs. The Army recently cancelled its Comanche Advanced Helo program that it had spent $8 billions on in development.

The bottom line is at least one of these "gold watches" is going to be terminated, maybe two. The umbers of aircraft bought on all of them will be reduced, if they are funded. So this is where the politics are being played. It's cut throat, back stabbing and brutal as each service fights for its piece of the DOD budget and believes its programs are the most important. They give the media all sorts of damaging reports on their competition, just like those that Randy Black has quoted. I don't think the war has much to do with saving or cancelling the V-22, but the Marines need something immediately to replace the CH-46.

Tim Brown's comments on the capability of the V-22 are exactly the Marine Corps' reasons for trying to procure it. Tim, once again proves the point that, "Once a Marine, always a Marine." If the Marines ever have to go into a high threat, hostile beach or metropolitan area that possesses an integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and Marines are flown to the attack in CH-46s or any troop carrying helo transport flying today, it will be just about unsurvivable. This is why there is so much riding on the V-22.

RH: My! This is worse that university politics, and university budgets are small change.

General Sullivan states that it normally takes up to a decade to get a plane from the drawing board to the battlefield, or words to that effect. So be it. We are now 22 years into development of the V-22 and it’s still a few years away from any real work for which the Marines had intended it. Unit costs are up to $120 million per plane from $30 million in the beginning. The Inspector General’s office called a Marine commander a liar after one of the crashes. General Sullivan has seen some of his best friends lose their jobs over these matters and seems to say “it wasn’t their fault,” the FAA doesn’t like the V-22, Marine pilots and mechanics have found that the V-22’s mechanical failure rates are double the older helicopters still in use since Viet Nam, other branches of the military have opted out of the program, maintenance records were falsified, men have been relieved of their commands in these matters, the GAO raises many objections, its lift capacity is not near what was contracted for, the best pilots the Marines have cannot safely fly it. Imagine what younger pilots will be faced with if it ever gets into their hands, General Sullivan admits that it’s a bear to work on, the list goes on and on. And then there are the thoughts of others, from the DoD, to pilots to other Marines involved to the FAA…. Read on:

“There is no doubt the V-22 is fundamentally unsafe and exorbitantly expensive. It has become the greatest scandal in US military history, but is kept alive by the Marine Corps' political machine described in a recent article in the Los Angeles Times. If the FBI would begin a probe, it will find ample evidence of fraud and racketeering. ….Retired Air Force helicopter pilot Colonel Harry Dunn has studied the V-22 program for over two years and consulted with numerous other rotorcraft experts about the tiltrotor's fundamental flaws. He became so angry at the waste and the likelihood of further deaths from this program that he recently sent an open letter to President Bush demanding action."

http://www.g2mil.com/moreV-22.htm

Ron Stroup; Certification and Safety Lead
Federal Aviation Administration;
Washington, DC

Case History #1 – V22 Osprey Program

…. Again, we are not trying to assign blame at the V22 program, its managers, engineers, or the brave members of the armed forces that support its development. Our purpose is singular; learning the lessons of the V22 could save future programs from suffering the same fate.

The following quote was taken directly from the front page of the Washington Post. "To save time and money, … omitted tests of the V-22 Osprey that would have provided additional data on rapid descents that contributed to a crash that killed 19 Marines in April, according to a new report by the General Accounting Office (ref. 1)
Figure 1 - V-22 Osprey

Unfortunately, as evidenced with the Osprey program, systems testing falls at the end of the development process regardless of the development model used, thereby, becoming a casualty of schedule and cost overruns. Unfortunately, the Osprey Program was so over budget and schedule and under severe scrutiny by both the media and Congress, that the maintenance and flight availability data were …falsified to ensure the program’s ultimate survival.

http://www.faa.gov/aio/common/documents/Safety/CostSked.htm

"Is the V-22 Osprey aircraft a must-buy for the United States?
No: This weapons technology is flawed and too costly and should be terminated".
By Christopher Hellman

....Full-scale development of the V-22 began in 1986 under President Reagan, and the first prototype flew in 1989. However, during the Bush administration the V-22 was a source of continual friction between then-defense secretary Richard Cheney and Congress. Cheney felt that the program's cost was unjustifiable, given its incremental improvements in capabilities and survivability. In fact, the Army, which originally had planned to purchase 231 V-22s, opted out of the program in 1987. In 1989 the Bush administration canceled the project.

The program was revived by the Clinton administration, yet it has been beset by a series of delays and cost overruns. Two of the first five prototypes were destroyed in crashes, the second of which, in 1992, took the lives of seven people. In 1988, the program planned to achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) - the earliest availability of a fully functional system which is operated by an adequately trained, equipped and supported military unit - in 1991. By 1998, the planned IOC had slipped by a decade, to 2001, and there is little likelihood that even this target can be met. In the meantime, $12 billion has been spent on the Osprey program to date.

In 1997,! the General Accounting Office (GAO), the federal government's auditing arm, warned of continued delays and cost increases in the program. According to the GAO, the V-22 "has not yet achieved program stability in terms of cost or aircraft design." More recently, a report prepared last summer by the Pentagon's inspector general (IG) found 23 major flaws that raised questions about the Osprey's reliability and effectiveness. In November 2000, Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's head of testing, issued a report which raised additional concerns about the aircraft's reliability and maintainability. The report described the V-22 as "operationally effective but not operationally suitable." In briefing Congress on the report, Coyle stated that the Osprey continued to be unreliable and that the costs to operate and maintain the aircraft could prove to be an "unacceptable burden."

….And then, in mid-January, Lt. Col. Fred Leberman, the commanding officer of the Osprey training squadron was relieved of his command after allegations that he told Marines to falsify maintenance records on the squadron's V-22s. While the Marine Corps asserts that there appears to be no connection between the falsified documents and the causes of the April or December crashes, the service has asked the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General to investigate the charges.

http://www.insightmag.com/news/2001/02/26/Symposium/Q.Is-The.V22.Osprey.Aircraft.A.MustBuy.For.The.United.States-210859.shtml

And then, Feb. 2003 brought us this news: Despite months of Pentagon skepticism toward the V-22, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his top advisers recommended spending $1.8 billion to buy nine models of the tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marines and two for the Air Force.

Government officials grounded the Osprey, jointly produced by Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters of Ridley Township, Pa., after two fatal crashes in 2000, but its proponents contend that the aircraft is making a comeback after performing well in flight tests.

http://pma275.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&news_id=41&page=5

And this: Unsafe Fuel Tanks

The first V-22 squadron commander, LtCol Odin “Fred” Leberman, had complained to the Inspector General that test results were withheld and that unsafe fuel tanks may have killed his Marines. The Inspector General's report called Leberman a liar, but this Aviation Week article reveals that unsafe fuel tanks were used during operational evaluation by Marine crews. They were lightweight composite (e.g. plastic) tanks that break from minor impact and are not considered crashworthy. Despite this known problem, Marines went ahead with operational testing and 19 Marines we! re incinerated in two crashes, although it is unknown if any would have survived if the V-22s had crashworthy fuel tanks required by well-established Navy safety regulations.

Deck Pig and Fuel Hog

As we noted last year, since the V-22 is as large as a CH-53E, the Corps will be unable to operate a composite MEU squadron with 12 V-22s from each flattop amphibious ship as it now does with CH-46Es. Ships must limit the amount of weight up on the flight deck for stability reasons. The Corps would probably be limited to a mix of 4 CH-53Es with 7 V-22s, whereas it could carry 4 CH-53Es and 14 MH-60S instead. This was confirmed by the Center for Naval Analysis in its recent 26-page report "Marine Corps Operations in Afghanistan: Key Themes and Implications for Transformation". This Marine Corps funded study also noted the V-22 burns twice as much fuel as the CH-46E, so it would have been a hindrance at Camp Rhino where all fuel was flown in by KC-130 tankers. Burning twice as much fuel will also greatly increase operating costs for Marine Corps squadrons.

High Rate of Descent Tests

Despite the outrageous cost and poor lift performance, the biggest problem with the V-22 is its lack of stability which can lead to total destruction of the aircraft. V-22s will wait until next Spring to conduct high rate of descent tests to see if they can match assault helicopter performance. In a Crucial Test three years ago, seven times during 21 high-altitude test flights at the Navy's Patuxent River air base, a V-22 suddenly began to roll when it was flown in an assault mode like the craft involved in the Arizona crash. In one case, a V-22 reached an 84-degree bank, its wings nearly perpendicular to the ground, according to a Bell/Boeing presentation to the Pentagon's "Blue Ribbo! n Panel," which investigated the aircraft after the 2000 accidents. A Pentagon source familiar with the V-22 testing says the aircraft lost 2000 feet of altitude before pilots regained control - a margin for error that would not exist in a low altitude military operation. Since the V-22 already failed high rate of descent tests and recent modifications did not address this fatal flaw, the results of the current tests should be similar, assuming they are fully disclosed.

http://www.g2mil.com/moreV-22.htm

RH: We have covered all sides of this debate in detail, and we must leave it now until there are new developments.

General Sullivan has sent an article from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (4/2/04) titled "Flaws In Osprey Being Corrected". It begins: "The Boeing Co. and Textron Inc. are making progress in correcting flaws in the assembly of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft that have hampered production and raised costs", Making progress? As I said, we have devoted an enormous amount of space to this issue, and we must wait until an impartial source informs us that progress has been made, and that the problems have been solved. Just wait.

Ronald Hilton -

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